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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
On appeal, Ms. Kaiser has argued that the district court erred when it denied her
motion to suppress evidence found after a magistrate issued a search warrant for her
residence. Specifically, she has contended that the information provided in support of
the search warrant was not sufficient to support its issuance.
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argues that probable cause is not defined as
more likely than not, and that under a definition of probable cause that is lower than
more likely than not, there was a substantial basis for the magistrate's finding of
probable cause to issue the warrant.
This Reply Brief is necessary to respond to the State's arguments concerning the
definition of probable cause, as well as whether the information was sufficient under the
lower standard advocated by the State.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Ms. Kaiser's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference.
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ISSUES
1.

Should probable cause require satisfying the more likely than not standard?

2.

Under the lower standard advocated by the State, did the district court have
sufficient information to support the issuance of a search warrant?
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ARGUMENT

I.
Probable Cause Should Require Satisfying The More Likely Than Not Standard
On appeal, Ms. Kaiser argued, inter a/ia,
No reasonable magistrate could have concluded, using a common sense
approach, that it was more likely than not that a person who had been
arrested twice in another state for possession of a controlled substance
(type or types unknown) six and eight years earlier and is the addressee
of an undelivered envelope containing three to four grams of
methamphetamine had methamphetamine in her home.
(Appellant's Brief, p.10.)
In response to this argument, the State argues, that Ms. Kaiser's argument
confus[es] a magistrate's probable cause determination with the legal
standard for preponderance of the evidence. That is not the correct
standard. As the United States Supreme Court has stated,
[f]inely tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable
doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence, useful in
formal trials, have no place in the magistrate's decision.
While an effort to fix some general, numerically precise
degree of certainty corresponding to "probable cause" may
not be helpful, it is clear that "only the probability, and not a
prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of
probable cause."
Gates, 462 U.S. at 235 (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410,
419 (1969)). Probable cause deals "with probabilities. These are not
technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life
on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act."
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949). Probable cause is a
fluid concept, "turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular
factual contexts - not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of
legal rules." Gates, 462 U.S. at 232. Again, applying the correct legal
standards, Kaiser has failed to show that the magistrate court lacked a
substantial basis for its probable cause determination.
(Respondent's Brief, pp. 7-8.)
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Ms. Kaiser notes that it remains an open question, under the United States
Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence (see infra), as to whether probable
cause means more likely than not or some lesser burden falling between reasonable
suspicion and the more likely than not standard. In light of that, and the case law cited
below, she asks that this Court adopt the more likely than not standard for probable
cause.
This issue has never been resolved by a majority of the United States Supreme
Court. See Valente v. Wallace, 332 F.3d 30, 32 (1 st Cir. 2003) (describing the issue of
whether probable cause amounts to a more likely than not standard as "unsettled" by
United States Supreme Court precedent); see also State v. Towne, 615 A.2d 484, 488
(Vt. 1992) (recognizing that many states have held that probable cause does not have
to meet more likely than not standard, but that a majority of the United States Supreme
Court has never explicitly so held). In a plurality opinion concerning the application of
the plain view doctrine, then-Justice Rehnquist wrote that probable cause "does not
demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false."
Texas v. Brow~ .460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) (plurality opinion).

Appellate courts in several states and at least two federal circuit courts have held
that probable cause requires satisfying a more likely than not standard. See Detention
of Petersen v. State, 42 P.3d 952, 957 (Wash. 2002) (when seeking to establish

probable cause to obtain a search warrant "the burden is on the State to recite objective
facts and circumstances which, if believed, would lead a neutral and detached person to
conclude that more probably than not, evidence of a crime will be found if a search
takes place") (citing Aguilarv. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States,
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393 U.S. 410 (1969)); McClain v. State, 984 S.W.2d 700, 702 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998)
("Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within an officer's personal
knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to
warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that, more likely than not, a particular
suspect has committed an offense"); State v. Groves, 805 N.E.2d 146, 150 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2004) (State did not establish probable cause for warrantless seizure of
suspected crack rock when it failed to establish that object police officer felt in
defendant's pocket was "more likely than not crack cocaine" before it was seized);
Elliott v. State, 597 So.2d 916, 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) ("Where the totality of the
circumstances more likely than not points to the commission of a crime, probable cause
to arrest and search exists"); United States v. Wabnik, 444 F.2d 203, 205 (2 nd Cir. 1971)
('The test [for determining probable cause] is whether ordinary, reasonable men,
possessed of the experience and knowledge of these detectives would conclude that
the transaction described above was more likely than not a criminal transaction");
United States v. Jones, 641 F.2d 425, 429 (6th Cir. 1981) (probable cause exists when a
fact is more likely than not true), overruled on other grounds by Steagalo v. United
States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981), as recognized by United States v. Hardin, 539 F.3d 404,
412 (6 th Cir. 2008).
It is worth noting that appellate courts in several states and at least three federal
circuit courts have held that probable cause need not meet the more likely than not
standard. See State v. Tompkins, 423 N.W.2d 823, 827 (Wis. 1988) ("What is required
is more than a possibility, but not a probability, that the conclusion is more likely than
not"); State v. Maxwell, 624 A.2d 926, 930 (Del. 1993) ("A finding of probable cause
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does not require the police to uncover information sufficient to prove a suspect's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt or even to prove that guilt is more likely than not"); United

States v. Melvin, 596 F.2d 492, 495 (1 st Cir. 1979) (rejecting attempt to define probable
cause as meaning "more likely than not"); United States v. Donnelly, 475 F.3d 946, 954
(8 th Cir. 2007); United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701, 705 (9 th Cir. 1983) (an affidavit of
probable cause in support of a search warrant "need not establish that it was 'more
likely than not' that evidence would be found").
Finally, one federal circuit court, the Seventh, has issued conflicting opinions on
the issue. See United States v. Anton, 633 F.2d 1252, 1254 (ih Cir. 1980) (probable
cause "might be said to exist if it is more likely than not that evidence of the illegal
activity will be found on the premises to be searched"); but see United States v. Sawyer,
224 F.3d 675, 678-79 (ih Cir. 2000) (probable cause does not require "evidence
demonstrating that it is more likely than not that the suspect committed a crime").
The Idaho Supreme Court does not appear to have ruled directly on this issue,
and the Idaho Court of Appeals has issued four opinions, three of which reject the more
likely than not standardr while one appears to adopt il See State v. Harper,~ Idaho
_

(Ct. App. July 18, 2011) ("A magistrate need only determine that it would be

reasonable to seek the evidence in the place indicated in the warrant, not that the
evidence sought is there in fact, or is more likely than not to be found, where the search
takes place") (citing State v. O'Keefe, 143 Idaho 278, 287 (Ct. App. 2006) and State v.

Fairchild, 121 Idaho 960, 966 (Ct. App. 1992)); but see State v. Wengren, 126 Idaho
662, 667 (Ct. App. 1995) ("We also conclude that it was reasonable for the magistrate to
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believe that the evidence sought was more likely than not to be found in the place
indicated in the warrant") (citing Fairchild).
One Idaho Supreme Court case contains an explanation of probable cause that
appears to define it as at least half of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. In that
case, the Court noted,
It is not necessary that the facts be sufficient upon which to base a verdict
of a jury, but they must be sufficient upon which to find probable cause for
the issuance of the warrant (that crime is being committed). But even if,
as said in United States v. McGuire (D.C.) 300 F. 98:
'The search warrant requires only 'probable cause;'
conviction requires satisfaction 'beyond a reasonable doubt.'
'Beyond a reasonable doubt' must include 'probable cause.'
But 'probable cause' does not include or measure up to
satisfaction 'beyond a reasonable doubt.' They are widely
different. 'Beyond a reasonable doubt' may be likened to the
summit of a high mountain, and 'probable cause' to a
halfway station on the mountain side,"
-- he who sits in judgment at the halfway station as to the existence of
"probable cause" must be the magistrate, and not the affiant who must
bear the burden of facts up the mountain to that station, rather than his
conclusions. He cannot leave at the foot of the mountain his load of facts,
and, with lightened and easy steps, recite at the halfway station his
conclusions as to facts which he does not choose to carry so far.
State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43,

254 P. 788, 794-95 (1927) (emphasis added).

In a more recent case, the Idaho Supreme Court, considering whether probable
cause had been established at a preliminary hearing, found that the magistrate had not
abused his discretion in finding probable cause because
the evidence produced by the State at the preliminary hearing established
that a crime had been committed and a reasonable person would believe
that Gibson had probably or likely participated in the commission of the
offense charged.
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State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 54, 57-58 (1983) (emphasis added). There is no principled

reason why the definition of probable cause applied at the preliminary hearing stage in
Gibson should not also apply to probable cause to issue a search warrant.

Rather than embracing the State's argument that probable cause is a "fluid"
concept, especially in light of the constitutional and practical implications of resorting to
such a vague and indefinable concept, this Court should affirmatively adopt a standard
that will allow police officers and magistrates to have a clear understanding of what is
required in order to obtain and issue search warrants. Adopting such a standard will
also ensure that the right of the people to be secure in their persons and property will be
respected, and enable constitutionally-appropriate supervision of the issuance of
warrants by trial and appellate courts.
For these reasons, Ms. Kaiser respectfully requests that this Court adopt a
probable cause jurisprudence that requires meeting the more likely than not standard.
For the reasons set forth in his Appellant's Brief, under such a standard, Ms. Kaiser has
established error in the denial of her motion to suppress.

11.
Even Under A Lower Standard, The District Court Lacked Sufficient Information To
Support The Issuance Of A Search Warrant
Assuming, arguendo, that probable cause does not require satisfying the more
likely than not standard, even under a lesser, "fluid" standard 1 advocated by the State,

1

It is doubtful that something "fluid" and indefinable could ever truly be described as
being a "standard."
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the magistrate lacked sufficient information to support its issuance of a search warrant.
As noted in her Appellant's Brief,
The information provided in support of the issuance of the search warrant
for Ms. Kaiser's residence is even less substantial than what was present
(yet found to be insufficient) in Hendricks. Here, the relevant information
presented to the magistrate was that a package containing three to four
grams of methamphetamine was addressed to Ms. Kaiser at her home
address, that Ms. Kaiser had previously been arrested or charged with
possession of a controlled substance (type or types unknown) in California
six and eight years prior, and that Ms. Kaiser's husband had been charged
with manufacturing a controlled substance (type unknown) at some time in
the past. While it is true that the return address on the envelope was
Modesto, California, the location of one of Ms. Kaiser's years-old arrests,
there was no indication that the postal service had previously found
suspicious deliveries to Ms. Kaiser or that the return address was genuine,
let alone that of a compatriot of Ms. Kaiser. Finally, the officer never
explained the significance of the facts presented, merely reciting in
boilerplate language that, in his training and experience, drug users and
dealers frequently possess weapons, records of drug transactions, and
drug paraphernalia. (R., p.46.)
The facts set forth in the affidavit failed to establish a nexus between
present illegal activities and Ms. Kaiser's residence.
The two prior
controlled substance incidents were from six and eight years earlier and
occurred in another state, with no indication that they ever resulted in
convictions. No information was provided as to the nature of the prior
arrests, whether they involved similar conduct (receiving drugs by mail),
and whether Ms. Kaiser was found to be in possession of drugs in her
prior home. No facts were presented as to how long Ms. Kaiser had
resided in Idaho, whether there was suspicious traffic near her home,
whether she had previously received suspicious packages, or whether she
was involved in drug possession or trafficking at any time in the recent
past.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.9-10.)
Ms. Kaiser submits that, whatever the standard, the magistrate lacked sufficient
information to provide a substantial basis for a finding of probable cause to issue the
search warrant at issue. As such, she respectfully requests that this Court vacate the
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district court's order denying her motion to suppress, and remand this matter to the
district court.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein and in her Appellant's Brief, Ms. Kaiser
respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order denying her motion
to suppress, and remand this matter to the district court to allow her to withdraw her
guilty pleas pursuant to the terms of her conditional plea agreement.
DATED this 30 th day of January, 2012.

SPENCERJ.HAHN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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